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3.1  Introduction 
International linkages between goods and asset markets are the key factors 
in  exchange rate  determination. The scope for activist stabilization policy 
depends on both the nature of  the equilibrium implied by  these linkages and 
the speed with which equilibrium is attained. Two important relationships- 
purchasing power parity, which links the exchange rate to relative national 
price  levels,  and  uncovered  interest rate  parity,  which  links  the expected 
future path  of  the  exchange rate  to  relative nominal  interest  rates-have 
received extensive empirical attention in recent years and are main building 
blocks of several empirical exchange rate models.'  The purpose of this paper 
is to review and extend recent empirical evidence on  these classical parity 
relationships within a rational expectations framework. 
When an  economy is small and both classical panty relations hold even 
in the short run, monetary policy cannot influence the ex ante real rate of 
interest. Insofar as the ex ante real rate is an important determinant of saving 
and investment decisions, an important channel for stabilization policy dis- 
appears.* In theoretical  models  of  Dombusch  (1976) and  Mussa  (1982), 
We  thank  J. Frenkel,  R.  Hodrick,  B. Loopesko,  R.  Meese, and  F. Mishkin  for helpful 
comments and discussions.  Assistance from N. Killefer and J. Withers is acknowledged with 
thanks. Obstfeld's research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foun- 
dation. 
1. Examples include Frenkel (1976). Bilson (1979), Frankel (1979a), Hodrick (1978), and 
Hooper and Morton (1982). 
2. In these circumstances, monetary policy also loses its power to exert a systematic influ- 
ence on the terms of  trade or real exchange rate, and a second avenue of demand management is 
thus closed. Even so, monetary policy can be effective if nominal wages are sticky (see Obstfeld 
1982~).  But this possibility disappears as well when wages are fully and instantaneously indexed 
to  the  aggregate  price  level.  While  monetary  policy  may  be  ineffective,  tax  policy  can 
always succeed in driving a wedge between home and foreign ex ante real rates. The discussion 
below  abstracts  from  taxes.  Also ignored  is the possibility  that changes  in  monetary growth 
rates might influence the terms of trade through real effects of the Tobin-Sidrauski sort. 
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temporary  price  level stickiness allows money to influence the real  interest 
rate in the short run even though  uncovered  parity holds exactly. Portfolio 
balance models of exchange rate determination  (such as those of  Girton and 
Henderson [  19771 and Branson [ 19791) stress imperfect substitution between 
bonds of  different  currency denomination. In  these  models, central  banks 
can influence real  interest  rates  if  they can  alter relative  outside  debt sup- 
plies. 
As  emphasized by Roll  and  Solnik  (1979), among others, the classical 
parity  relations  need not hold in a setting of uncertainty  and risk  aversion, 
even when prices are fully flexible and agents efficiently exploit all welfare- 
augmenting arbitrage  opportunities.  Unless at least one parity  relationship 
fails, monetary policy cannot affect the expected real rate of  interest; but the 
invalidity of  a parity condition does not, in itself,  imply that monetary pol- 
icy has this power (see Henderson  [in this volume] and Obstfeld  [19826]). 
Thus,  the  series  of  tests  performed below  is  at  best  a  single  component 
of  a  more extensive inquiry  into the role of  monetary  policy  in  the  open 
economy. 
A central theme in our review of empirical work is the conditional  heter- 
oscedasticity  of inflation and exchange rate forecast errors, and the bias this 
econometric problem  may  impart  to tests  of  international  parity  relation- 
ships. Below, we propose and  implement  a test  for conditional  heterosce- 
dasticity which  in many cases produces  strong evidence that the problem  is 
indeed important. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews the classical parity 
conditions and examines the recent behavior of bilateral ex post real interest 
rate differentials  between the United  States and the United Kingdom, Ger- 
many, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan. Section 3.3 carries out bilateral tests 
of  ex  ante real  interest  rate  equality between  the  United  States  and these 
countries. Section 3.4 is devoted to empirical tests of uncovered interest rate 
parity.  Finally,  section  3.5  tests  the  hypothesis  that  relative  purchasing 
power parity  has held ex ante during the recent era of exchange rate flexi- 
bility. 
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3.2  Classical Parity Relationships and Real Interest Rates 
duce the following notation: 
To facilitate  formal discussion  of the classical parity relations, we intro- 
P, = price level in the “home”  country at the end of  period t; 
PT  = price level in the “foreign”  country at the end of  period t; 
3.  If  there  are  no  default  risks,  covered  interest  arbitrage  is  riskless  (in  home  currency 
terms), and  so covered  interest parity  must always hold exactly  in  the absence of  transaction 
costs. In contrast, uncovered  arbitrage  involves home currency risk in an  essential way.  The 
relation between covered and uncovered interest parity is discussed in  Section 111,  below. 123  International Interest Rate and Price Level Linkages 
the exchange rate at the end of period t, defined as the 
home currency price of foreign currency; 
In (1 + Ik,,), where lk,r is the home country k-period 
nominal interest rate at the end of period r; 
In (1  + If,,),  where I&  is the foreign country k-period 
nominal interest rate at the end of period t; 
Conditional expectation operator, based on information 
available at the end of  period t. 
Purchasing power parity (PPP), in its relative form, states that the rate at 
which the relative price of two currencies changes over time must equal the 
difference between the national inflation rates.  The doctrine of  PPP has a 
long intellectual history, which is surveyed by Frenkel (1976, 1978). Using 
the foregoing notation, the PPP relation may be  written as 
(1) 
An implication of  (1) is that relative PPP must be expected to hold ex ante, 
that is, for any k, 
In  (Sr/S,- ,)  = In (P,/P,_  ,) - In (PTlP? - ,). 
(2)  Et[ln (si+k/st)l  = El  [In (Pf+k/Pf)  -  (PT+k/P?)I. 
The ex ante relative PPP condition (2) is weaker than (l), of  course. Magee 
(1978) and Roll (1979) have suggested an  “efficient markets” interpretation 
of ex ante PPP for a world with low transport costs. 
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that the nominal interest differ- 
ential between similar bonds denominated in different currencies must equal 
the expected change in the logarithm of the exchange rate over the holding 
period. This explanation of  international differences in nominal interest rates 
is associated with Fisher (1930). UIP implies that, for any k, 
(3)  Rk,t -  Rf.1 = Et[ln(st+k/Sr)l 
Condition (3) must  hold  when  bonds  differing only  in their currencies of 
denomination are perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios. 
Define the expected or ex ante k-period real  interest rates for the home 
and foreign countries by 
(4a)  rk,f  Rk,t -  Et[ln (Pf+k/Pt)lt 
(4b) 
By  combining (2) and (3) with (4a) and (4b), we  find that 
rf,, = R& -  E,[ln (PT  +LIP?)]. 
(5)  rk,t  = rf,t. 
Thus, under ex ante relative PPP and uncovered interest rate parity, ex ante 
real rates of  interest must be equalized internationally. The classical parity 
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domestic economic activity through financial policy measures aimed at influ- 
encing the expected real interest rate. 
Figures 3.1 through 3.5 plot monthly series of  ex post  1 -month real inter- 
est  rate  differentials between  the  United  States and  the  United  Kingdom, 
Germany,  Switzerland, Canada, and Japan. (The data are expressed on an 
annualized basis.) The series begin in January 1976 and are based on whole- 
sale price index inflation rates and  1 -month Eurocurrency deposit rates. 
Because the figures use nonoverlapping monthly data involving  1  -month- 
ahead forecasts,  the  deviations from  ex  post  real  rate  equality  should  be 
serially uncorrelated and trendless if  agents’ expectations are rational and 
real rates are equal across countries ex ante. All  five figures suggest some 
degree of both  serial dependence and trend, however. Ex  post real rates in 
both the United Kingdom and Germany, for example, appear to have been 
on the whole above those in the United States over the period lasting from 
roughly July  1977 to December  1979. Between early  1976 and mid-1978, 
Swiss and Japanese ex post real rates were persistently above those in the 
United States. The figures show a pronounced rise in  United States ex post 
real rates relative to those in the five other countries beginning around the 
end of  1980. 
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entials over the period since January 1976, conclusive evidence can be pro- 
vided only by econometric tests. We now turn to these. 
3.3 The Equality of Ex Ante Real Interest Rates 
The equality of ex ante real interest rates across countries has been tested 
in  papers by  Hodrick  (1979) and  Mishkin  (1982).  Hodrick  (1979),  using 
monthly data on 3-month rates, performs bilateral tests to compare ex ante 
real rates in the United States and four other OECD countries over the pe- 
riod of generalized floating. He concludes that the empirical record, though 
mixed, is not inconsistent with the validity of condition (5). Mishkin (1982) 
carries out multilateral tests of  equality using quarterly data for the United 
States and  six  other OECD countries.  Over both  the  1967:11-1979:11  and 
1973:11-1979:11  sample periods, he obtains strong rejections of  the hypoth- 
esis that ex ante real interest rates in the seven countries were equal. 
In this section we test equation (5), taking into account the possible de- 
pendence of the conditional covariances of  relative inflation forecast errors 
on  nominal interest differentials. Such dependence induces a heteroscedas- 
ticity problem which invalidates hypothesis tests unless standard errors are 
estimated in an appropriate manner. Below, we  establish the presence of  a 
conditional heteroscedasticity problem  and  then use appropriate estimators 
to conduct a test similar to one of  Hodrick’s (1979). The results, based on 
monthly data, are on the whole unfavorable to the hypothesis that expected 
real interest rates have been equalized internationally in recent years. 
3.3.1 A Test of the Hypothesis 
The assumption of  rational expectations yields a simple bilateral  test of 
the hypothesis that  ex ante real rates are equal across countries. Let  n,+k 
and nf+k  denote the realized inflation rates in the home and foreign countries 
between the end of period t and the end of period t  + k. Then 
(64 
(6b) 
nt+k = Erb  (pr+k/pt)l  -k  Uf+k, 
n?+k  = E,[ln  (p?+k/p?)l  + U?+k, 
where U,+k  and U?+k  are mean-zero inflation forecast errors uncorrelated with 
any variables observed by  the market by  the end of period t. Because sub- 
sequent forecast errors are not part of  that  information  set,  E(U,+kU,+k-j), 
= 0 for j  2  k. Combining (4a), (4b), and (5) with (6a) and (6b), we obtain 
the relation 
E(U,*,kU?+k-,)  f 0 fOrj < k  even though  E(U,+kU,+k-,)  = E(U?-$lf*+k-,) 
(7)  n,+k -  n?+k  = Rk,r -  R$J + U,+k -  U?+k. 
Because the composite forecast error  er+k  = U,+k  - U:+k  is  uncorrelated 
with  Rk,( and R&  (both of  which are known to agents at the end of  period 
t), the parameters a and b in the regression equation 128  Robert E. Cumby and Maurice Obstfeld 
(8) 
may be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares (OLS). A test of the 
hypothesis  [a  b]’ =  [0  11’ is  a  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  expected  real 
interest rates are equal in  the home and foreign ~ountry.~ 
While  OLS  is  consistent  when  applied  to  equation  (8),  it  is  generally 
inefficient  relative  to an  instrumental  variables  estimator  of  the  type  dis- 
cussed by  Cumby, Huizinga,  and Obstfeld (1983) and by  Hansen  (1982).5 
Because et+k is orthogonal to any variables in agents’ information set at time 
t, many  instrumental  variables  are available.  Below, we use  third-country 
interest rates as additional instruments to estimate the parameters of (8) by 
the  two-step  two-stage  least  squares  (2S2SLS)  technique  described  by 
Cumby, Huizinga,  and Obstfeld ( 1983).6 
Let Qr denote the row vector [l(R,,,  -  R&)] and stack the T observations 
on (8) to obtain  the regression  model  IT  - IT* = Qd  + e, where d = [a 
b]’.  Let X,  be a row vector of  instrumental variables (including Q,),  all of 
which  are  uncorrelated  with  f?t+k.  Then the  2S2SLS  estimate  of  d can  be 
written as 
Tt+k -  T,*+k  = a + b(R,,,  -  R&)  -k  er+k 
(9) 
4. This test is suggested by Hodrick (1979). However, he uses the k-period forward premium 
rather  than  the  k-period nominal  interest  differential  on  the  right-hand  side of  (8). The two 
procedures  should yield very similar results  when Eurocurrency interest rates are being com- 
pared (see section 3.4). 
5. The reason is that the latter uses more information. As noted in the next paragraph of the 
text, OLS is a special “just  identified”  case of this type of instrumental variables estimator. 
6. When the forecast horizon k  exceeds 1 period,  e,+k is  serially correlated and, under the 
null hypothesis,  has the covariance matrix of a moving average (MA) process. As Hansen and 
Hodrick  (1980)  note,  two-step  serial  correlation  corrections  of  the generalized  least squares 
type are inconsistent, even though QLS is consistent. The inconsistency is due to the fact that 
the nominal interest differential  is not a strictly exogenous variable. To see this,  suppose that 
k  = 3, so that the hypothesis involves 3-month interest rates observed monthly.  Assume that 
the vector  stochastic  process  [(m,  - pt)(R3,, - Rf.,)]’ is covariance  stationary and  has the 
indeterministic bivariate Wold representation 
x  2 
where Ef(v,+,)  = Ef(w,+,) = 0 forj  > 0 (see Sargent 1979, p. 257). Under the null hypothesis, 
Er(n,+) - nX4 =  p<v,-, + 2 6,w,-,  + 
wt. Thus, if  ex ante real interest rates are equal, 9, = 0, 8,  =  I, pz = GZ  +  1.  and 6, = 8,+3. 
This implies that n,+i - ..,*ti  -  RT,,  + Rf., = v,+~  + +lv,+2 + 4~2v,+1  + 01~,+2  + %w,+I 
= el+,. Now  el-,  has the covariance matrix of an MA process and, by  Granger’s lemma (see 
Ansley,  Spivey, and  Wrobleski  1977). can be  written as an  invertible second-order MA  pro- 
cess, e,+, = (,+3  + A,<,+*  + A?<,+ I. But even though e,,, is uncorrelated with the regressors 
in (8), (,+?  need not be; and therefore application of a generalized least squares transformation 
to (8) will generally induce a nonzero correlation between the filtered disturbance  <r+3 and the 
filtered regressors.  For a more detailed argument, see Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1983). 
Hansen and  Hodrick (1980) use the Wold theorem to provide a similar characterization of  the 
form of the forward exchange rate forecast error when contract periods overlap in  the data. 
x  x  z  z 
k+3yt-, + 2 Oi+?w,-, = R3.1  - Rf., = 
t=o  ,=o  ,=I  ,=I 129 
where R is  a consistent estimate of  R  = limT,,  ((lIT)E(X’ee’X).  Under 
standard regularity conditions (which include covariance stationarity of  all 
series), fl(>  -  6)  converges to a normal random vector with  mean zero 
and asymptotic covariance matrix plim T*(Q’Xa-’X’Q)-’.  When X  = Q,  > reduces to the QLS estimator (Q’Q>-’Q’(IT  -  IT*). 
Computation of  d and its asymptotic covariance matrix requires a consis- 
tent estimate of a.  If  we assume that for all j,  the conditional covariance 
(10)  E(e,+ke,+k-j  I X,, .  . .  ,Xt-j) = uj, 
a constant, then  d^  may be written as 
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(1  1)  2 = [Q’x(x’~~-’x‘QI-’Q’x(x~~~-’x~(~  -  IT*) 
where 2 is an  estimate of  the  variance-covariance matrix E(ee’),  formed 
using the residuals from a first-step, consistent estimation of  (8) (by OLS, 
say). The matrix 
(12) 
provides  a  consistent  estimate  of  the  asymptotic  covariance  matrix  of 
fl(2 -  d)  in this special case. (The usual textbook formula for the asymp- 
totic  covariance  matrix  of  the  two-stage  least  squares  estimator  [see 
Dhrymes  19741 is based on assumption [lo]  and the assumption that uj  = 
0 for j > 0.) 
Formula (1  2)  is used by  Hodrick  (1  979) to calculate the asymptotic con- 
fidence ellipse for OLS estimates of  (8).  But  (12)  is not justified, even  in 
the  OLS  case,  unless  the  conditional covariances of  forecast  errors with 
respect to lagged interest differentials are constants.’  Condition (10) would 
be valid if the variables included in X, were all strictly exogenous; but that 
is certainly not the case here.’  The validity of  (10)  is thus an issue of  con- 
siderable importance in constructing hypothesis tests concerning the coeffi- 
cients of  (8). Below, we describe and implement a test of  (10). 
is more involved.  Hansen 
(1982) suggests the following procedure. As before, generate estimates Zt of 
the residuals of  (8) using some consistent (but not necessarily efficient) es- 
timation procedure, for example, OLS. Then, calculate a consistent estimate 
S(€J  of the spectral density matrix of the vector stochastic process [X;Z,], 
T[  Q ’X(X’  2X)  -  ‘X’  Q]  - ’ 
When  (10) fails,  estimation of  the  matrix 
7. See Dhrymes (1974), pp.  183-84.  A more recent discussion of the failure of assumption 
(10) in regression models with i.n.i.d. residuals appears in White (1980). For time series mod- 
els, see  Engle  (1982) and  Hansen  (1982).  It  is  important  to  note that  even if  (10) does not 
hold, the estimator given in  (I  1) still yields  consistent (but relatively inefficient) estimates of 
parameters. 
8. The condition would also be valid if  the  instruments and disturbances  were jointly nor- 
mally distributed. Without  the joint  normality  assumption, however, lack  of  correlation  need 
not imply statistical independence. 130  Robert E. Cumby and Maurice Obstfeld 
A consistent estimate of 0, is provided by  27rS^(O). This heteroscedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix estimator is convenient, as it does not  require 
detailed  specification  of  either  the  nature  of  the  heteroscedasticity or  the 
nature of the serial correlation in the residuals of  (8).9 
3.3.2 A Test of  Conditional Homoscedasticity 
To determine the appropriate estimator for the matrix R  in (9), the em- 
pirical validity of assumption (10) must be examined. Here, we test (10) for 
the case j  = 1. In that case, (10) asserts that 
(14) 
a constant, so that the forecast error er+k  is conditionally homoscedastic with 
respect to time t  values of  the instrumental variables. Rejection of  (14) is 
clearly a  sufficient indication that formula (1  2) is inappropriate and may lead 
to faulty inferences. 
Since our ultimate goal is to test whether a  = 0 and b =  1  in (8),  it is 
reasonable to test  for conditional heteroscedasticity under the tentative as- 
sumption that  the  null  hypothesis of  ex  ante real  interest  rate  equality is 
valid.  That assumption implies that  is  simply the  composite forecast 
error  7r, - IT:  - Rk,,  + R&,  which  is  observable.  By  the properties of 
conditional  means,  the  random  variable v,+~  = e?+k - E(e?+k  I X,) has 
unconditional mean  zero and is uncorrelated with any variable in the infor- 
mation set generated by X,. If  (14) is valid, qr+k  = er+k - IT’, and so (14) 
can be tested by  estimating an equation of  the form 
E(e?+k  I Xr) = u2, 
2 
2 
(15)  ei+k = a -t p(Rk.r -  Rk*,r) + y(Rk,i -  + ‘%+k. 
A test of  the hypothesis p = y = 0 is a test of  conditional homoscedastic- 
ity.  Because qt+k  is uncorrelated with  the regressors in (15) (all of  which 
are included in the information set generated by instrumental variables dated 
t or earlier), OLS yields consistent parameter estimates. But  2S2SLS  again 
yields an  efficiency gain  in  general.  Any  variables in  the  information  set 
generated by  X, may be used as instrumental variables.” 
The foregoing test is similar in spirit to one proposed by  White (1980) for 
cross-sectional  estimation  environments.  White  suggests  regressing  esti- 
mated equation residuals on cross-products of regressors. His procedure thus 
9. One can of course obtain covariance matrix estimates by  imposing such information if  it 
is known. Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1983)  describe one way of  doing this. Their method 
is implemented in obtaining the empirical results reported in this paper. White (1980 has pro- 
posed  a heteroscedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix estimator in  a cross-sectional context, 
along with a test of  homoscedasticity.  White’s test is discussed further below. 
10.  Any  product  of  instrumental  variables  is  a  legitimate  regressor  in  (1.5).  but  we  have 
excluded  all but  two in  the  a priori  belief  that  the others are  less  likely to be  significant in 
explaining  e:+k. It  is  worth emphasizing  that  the possibility  of  conditional  heteroscedasticity 
does not contradict the assumption that e,+k follows a covariance stationary process. The latter 
assumption requires only that the unconditional variance of e,+k  be constant over time. 131  International Interest Rate and Price Level Linkages 
imposes no a priori coefficient constraints. The present setting, however, is 
one in which a simple null hypothesis is to be tested. Absence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity when the null is imposed is clearly necessary  if formula 
(12) is to lead to valid inferences. 
Table  3.1 contains the  homoscedasticity test  results  based  on  monthly 
data. Five countries-the  United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, 
and Japan-are  compared with the United States in the tests of ex ante real 
interest rate equality camed out below. Choosing an appropriate price index 
and interest rate is in itself an issue of  considerable importance. Thus, the 
Table 3.1  Conditional Homoscedasticity of Inflation Forecast Errors 
Countries  Interest Rate 
Price  Test 
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Nore; Data for tests  using  1-month interest rates run from January  1976 to September  1981. 
Data for tests using 3-month interest rates run from January  1976 to July 1981. The test statistic 
is distributed asymptotically as ~‘(2).  An  * = rejection at the 5% level; ** = rejection at the 
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tests are performed for both consumer price index (CPI) and wholesale price 
index (WPI) inflation rates and for three nominal interest rates, the  1 -month 
and  3-month  Eurocurrency  rates  and  a  domestic  3-month  money  market 
rate."  All the resulting possibilities are represented in table 3.1  .I2 
The results illustrate the empirical relevance of the conditional heterosce- 
dasticity problem in tests of real interest rate equality.  In  20 of the 30 tests, 
the  hypothesis  of  conditional  homoscedasticity  can  be  rejected  at  the  5% 
level.  In  five of  the remaining  cases, the hypothesis can be rejected  at the 
20% level.  Taken together,  these results contradict the simplifying assump- 
tions under  which  formula  (12) is a consistent estimator of the  asymptotic 
covariance  matrix.  Accordingly,  a heteroscedasticity-consistent  covariance 
matrix estimator is used to obtain the test results analyzed below. 
3.3.3 Empirical Results 
Tables 3.2A, 3.2B, and 3.2C report the results of bilateral tests of equal- 
ity between the United States real interest rate and those of the United King- 
dom,  Germany,  Switzerland, Canada,  and  Japan.I3 Except  in  the  United 
Kingdom and Japanese cases, equality is strongly rejected  for all combina- 
tions of price  index and  interest rate. The rejections  in tests using  onshore 
money  market  interest  rates  (table  3.2~)  may  in  some  cases  be  plausibly 
ascribed to the existence or prospect of capital controls. However, the rejec- 
tions are almost equally strong when Eurocurrency interest rates are used in 
place of money market rates; and arbitrage between differently denominated 
Eurocurrency  deposits  has  not  been  restricted.14  On  the  whole,  it  seems 
difficult  to explain  the rejections of real  interest  rate equality by  appealing 
to institutional factors that hinder international movements of  capital. 
11.  In  order to  distinguish  empirically  between  inflation risk  and  default  risk,  studies of 
United  States real  interest rates  focus on  United  States treasury bills, which yield  a riskless 
nominal return (Fama  1975; Shiller  1980; Mishkin  1981). As Mishkin (1982) observes, cross- 
country comparisons of real interest rates are most informative when the bonds being compared 
have the  same default and political  risk characteristics.  This  is true of  Eurocurrency deposits 
denominated  in  different  currencies, but  not of  onshore  bonds  traded  in  different  countries' 
financial centers. Thus, tests of  real rate equality using domestic money market interest rates 
should be interpreted with caution. Another cause for caution is the fact that the prices entering 
CPIs and WPIs are not all sampled every month in revising the previous month's  index; indeed 
some prices are observed only once a year (see Fama  1977; Nelson and Schwert  1977; Shiller 
1980). This means that over short periods, changes in the price indices correspond only imper- 
fectly  to actual  price  level  movements.  Because the  implied measurement errors  are  serially 
correlated, our tests of  real  interest rate equality  are, to some extent, biased.  It would be of 
considerable  interest to perform these tests on  12-month interest and inflation rates. 
12. The instrumental variables  in  these regressions were the time t nominal interest differ- 
entials for all countries in the sample and the time t nominal interest differentials squared. All 
data are described in the Appendix. 
13.  The  instrumental variables  in  the regressions were the time t nominal interest differen- 
tials for all countries in the sample. 
14.  Further, any  political  risks attaching  to  Eurocurrency  deposits  are  not  denomination- 
specific,  and  thus  should not  influence ex ante real interest differentials  in  the Eurocurrency 
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Table 3.2  Equality of Ex Ante Real Interest Rates 
~~ 
A. One-Month Eurocurrency Rates (January  1976-September  1981) 
Price  Test 
Countries  Index  ci  6  Statistic 
U .S  ./U.  K.  CPI  -  .0119  ,7362  2.22 
U.S ./U.K.  WPI  -  ,0216  .8197  5.34 
U.S./Germany  CPI  .0278  ,503  1  9.13* 
(  .0086)  (.2351) 
(  ,0093)  (.27  13) 
(.0095)  ( ,2264) 
(.0148)  (.3529) 
(.O 125)  (. 1970) 
(.0178)  (.2655) 
(.0054)  (.1915) 
(.0070)  ( ,3429) 
(.0177)  ( ,2902) 
(.0125)  (.2350) 
U.S./Germany  WPI  .0484  -.1371  11.21** 
U .S  ./Switzerland  CPI  ,0350  ,3708  10.25** 
U.S./Switzerland  WPI  ,0844  -  ,3187  25.16** 
U.S./Canada  CPI  .0010  ,4043  12.61** 
U.  S./Canada  WPI  -  .01 I1  ,0317  8.01* 
U.S ./Japan  CPI  -  ,0028  ,9623  .24 
U.  S  ./Japan  WPI  ,0379  ,0467  16.81** 
B.  Three-Month Eurocurrency Rates (January  1976-July  198  1) 
Price  Test 
Countries  Index  ci  6  Statistic 
U.S./U.K. 
U.S./U.K. 
U.  S./Germany 
U.S ./Germany 
U.S./Switzerland 
U,  S  .IS witzerland 
U.S./Canada 
U .S./Canada 
U.  S  ./Japan 








w  PI 
CPI 
WPI 
-  ,0156 
(.0084) 

















-  .0091 
,7464 





-  ,0972 
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Table 3.2  (continued) 
C. Domestic Money Market Rates (January  1976-July  1981) 
Price  Test 
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U .  S ./Switzerland 
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U. S ./Japan 


































(.  1974) 
,3137 
(.  1276) 
,1643 
(.2569) 






















Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The test  statistic  is distributed  asymptotically  as 
~~(2).  * = rejection at the 5% level; ** = rejection at the  1%  level. 
In  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom, the  evidence  is  on the  whole  very 
favorable to the hypothesis  that ex ante real rates  in the United  States and 
United  Kingdom  have been  equal  during  the  recent  years  of  floating  ex- 
change rates.  While the  United  Statedunited Kingdom test  statistic  lies  in 
the 5% critical region in one case and is quite high  in the others, the large 
size of the estimated constant term (2) relative to its estimated standard error 
is often the cause. In contrast, the estimated slope coefficient  (b)  is, in half 
the cases, within  a standard deviation of  unity.  This evidence is consistent 
with the existence of a constant ex ante real interest differential between the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The evidence therefore suggests that 
real interest rates in the two countries, though possibly different, are closely 
linked. 
Tests  for Japan  using CPI inflation  rates  and Eurocurrency  interest rates 
support  the  hypothesis  of  real  interest  rate  equality.  When  WPI  inflation 
rates are used in defining real interest rates, however, the hypothesis is eas- 
ily rejected.  Use of the CPI inflation rate together with the domestic money 
market  nominal  interest  rate  yields  a  x2  statistic that  is quite  close  to the 
critical value of 5.99. 
An  interesting  feature of  the  results  is that  nominal  interest  differentials 135 
have significant explanatory power  in equations with the CPI inflation dif- 
ferential as the dependent variable, but  do not  usually help  in forecasting 
relative WPI inflation rates. The United Kingdom is again an  exception in 
this respect: nominal United States-United  Kingdom interest differentials are 
significant (and relatively  unbiased) predictors of  CPI  and  WPI  inflation 
rates. The greater importance of  the interest differential in CPI regressions 
is not  surprising, for the expected future CPI is probably a better measure 
of  the  anticipated future “real”  value of  money to consumers than is the 
expected WPI.  l5 
The tests demonstrate that ex ante real interest rate equality is often re- 
jected decisively over the recent floating exchange rate period. In an attempt 
to shed light on  the reasons for rejection, we  now examine the two compo- 
nents  of  the hypothesis,  uncovered  interest parity  and  ex  ante purchasing 
power parity. 
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3.4 Expectations and Nominal Interest Differentials 
The hypothesis that  expected exchange rate  movements offset  nominal 
interest differentials so as to equalize expected nominal yields internationally 
has been tested extensively. Work in this area by  Frenkel (1981) generally 
supports the view  that  uncovered  interest rate  parity  (UIP) has  held  quite 
closely over the period of  generalized floating. However, a number of other 
studies reject the  same hypothesis quite  strongly  (see Geweke and  Feige 
1979; Tyron  1979; Hansen and Hodrick  1980, 1983; Bilson  1981; Cumby 
and  Obstfeld  1981; Hakkio  1981; Longworth  1981; Hsieh  1982; among 
others). 
We  discuss  below  some  econometric issues  that  arise in  tests of  UIP. 
Among these, once again, is the problem of  conditional heteroscedasticity, 
which is found to be important in the recent data. Tests of  UIP which take 
this problem into account are performed, and these provide strong evidence 
against that hypothesis. 
3.4.1  A Test of  the Hypothesis 
In the absence of  default risk or transaction costs, covered interest arbi- 
trage equates the forward premium on foreign exchange to the nominal in- 
terest differential between home and foreign currency bonds. Keynes (1 923) 
provides the classic exposition. Denoting by  Fk,r  the k-period forward price 
of  foreign exchange, the covered interest parity condition may be written as 
(16)  Rk,r -  R?,r  = In (Fk,r) - In (st). 
Empirical studies such as Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977, 1981), Marston 
15.  Fama (1975) uses the CPI inflation rate in his study of  the predictive power of  United 
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(1976), and McCormick  (1979), show that  (16) holds  quite closely  in  the 
Eurocurrency market, where the interest-bearing assets being compared have 
identical default and political risk characteristics. 
If  UIP holds, then (3) and (16) imply that 
(17)  Er[ln (sr+dl = In (Fk,r) 
or, equivalently, that 
(18) 
where  vr+k,  the k-period forecast error In (Sr+k) -  &[In  (Sr+J], has mean 
zero and  is uncorrelated  with  information available  at  the end of period  t. 
According to (18), the logarithm of the forward rate is an unbiased predictor 
of  the future spot rate, and  I-period-ahead  forecast errors (k  =  1) are seri- 
ally uncorrelated.  When UIP fails, (17) becomes 
In  (sr+k)  = In (Fk,r) + Vr+k, 
(19)  Er[ln  (Sr+dl =  In (Fk.r) + 4 
where c$~  is a risk premium  which  may  fluctuate through  time and  may  be 
serially correlated.  Recent theoretical  work  shows that when  asset  holders 
are risk  averse, market efficiency  is consistent with the existence of a non- 
zero, possibly time-varying,  risk premium (see, e.g., Grauer, Litzenberger, 
and  Stehle  1976;  Kouri  1977;  Stockman  1978; Frankel  1979b;  Hodrick 
1981; Stulz 1981). When a nonzero risk premium exists, bonds denominated 
in  different currencies  are imperfect substitutes in portfolios.  The empirical 
implications  of  imperfect  asset  substitutability  are  that  In (FkJ is  not  in 
general an unbiased predictor of  In (Sr+,J and that the forward forecast error 
In (S,+k)  - In (Fk,J  need not be uncorrelated with information available to 
the market at time t. 
Frenkel (1981) tests UIP by estimating the parameters of the equation 
(20)  In (Sr+l) = a + b In (Fj,r) + vr+1 
using monthly data (sampled from June  1973 to July  1979) on the spot and 
I-month-forward  dollar prices of the pound  sterling,  the  French  franc,  and 
the deutsche mark.16 A test of the hypothesis [a  b]’ = [0 I]’ is a test of the 
UIP condition. Frenkel finds that the results of estimation are “broadly  con- 
sistent”  with  the  hypothesis  that  nominal  interest  differentials  can  be  ex- 
plained entirely by expected exchange rate movements. 
A problem  with  the  foregoing test, pointed  out by  Hansen  and  Hodrick 
(1980) and by Meese and Singleton (1982), is that the stochastic processes 
generating  the  logarithms of spot and  forward exchange rates may be  non- 
stationary.  Even though least squares estimates of a and b in (20)  will often 
16. Similar tests have been conducted by  Frenkel (1976) (for the German experience of  the 
1920s), Stockman (1978), and Frankel (1980). Levich (1978, 1979) surveys the early literature 
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be  consistent in a nonstationary estimation environment, the usual asymp- 
totic  theory  invoked  to  construct  hypothesis  tests  becomes  inapplicable. 
Mussa’s (1979) observation that the logarithms of  exchange rates seem to 
follow approximately a random walk is supported by  statistical tests imple- 
mented  by  Meese  and  Singleton  (1982).  These  tests,  which  involve the 
United States dollar’s exchange rate against the Canadian dollar, the Swiss 
franc, and the deutsche mark, cannot reject the hypothesis that unit roots are 
present in the univariate autoregressive representations of  the logarithms of 
spot and forward rates. The Meese-Singleton findings suggest that the pos- 
sibility of  nonstationarity needs to be taken seriously in designing and eval- 
uating hypothesis tests involving exchange rates. 
A procedure that often avoids the unit-root problem is to test whether a 
= 0 and b = 1 in the equation 
(21)  In (Sr+k/St)  = U  + b  (Fk,isr)  + Vr+k. 
Under the hypothesis of  UIP, (21) is equivalent to (20), and states that the 
k-period forward premium is the market’s expectation of  the change in the 
logarithm of the spot rate over the next k periods. Like the tests cited above 
as rejecting UIP, the test just  described works in terms of  first differences 
rather than levels. Thus, the asymptotic theory used in testing is more likely 
to be justifiable. 
Equation  (21) is estimated below,  and the hypothesis that a  = 0 and b 
=  1 is tested. The tests are bilateral (unlike Bilson’s [1981]), but expand 
Frenkel’s ( 198  1) information set by using third-currency forward premia ob- 
served at time t (which are uncorrelated with the disturbance v,+~)  as instru- 
mental variables in forming 2S2SLS estimates of  [a b]’.  This yields param- 
eter estimates more efficient than those produced by  OLS, and so a more 
stringent test of  the null hypothesis. Like Hansen and Hodrick (1980), we 
use weekly data on 3-month forecasts. 
3.4.2 A Test of  Conditional Homoscedasticity 
Tests  of  UIP  have  almost  universally  assumed  that  the  conditional 
covariances of  forecast errors do not  depend on  lagged forward premia.17 
Because the forward premium is not a strictly exogenous variable, this as- 
sumption may be false, in which case the customary standard error estima- 
tors have no asymptotic justification. As  in the previous section, it is there- 
fore of interest to test the conditional homoscedasticity assumption formally 
under the null hypothesis that UIP holds. 
This can once again be done by  estimating the equation 
17.  Hansen  and Hodrick  (1980) make  this  assumption explicitly. In a later  paper, Hansen 
and  Hodrick  (1983) allow  for conditional heteroscedasticity in  testing a forward  foreign ex- 
change pricing model. Hsieh (1982) accounts for conditional heteroscedasticity in his tests and 
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Table 3.3  Conditional Homoscedasticity of  Forward-Rate Forecast Errors 
(Weekly Data January 1976-June  1981) 
Exchange Rate  Test Statistic 










Nore: The test statistic is distributed asymptotically as ~'(2).  * = rejection at the 5% level; ** 
= rejection at the  1%  level. 
Under conditional homoscedasticity , the expected value of  v:,  k  conditional 
on forward premia observed at time t  is  a constant. Thus,  we  should find 
that  p  = y  = 0 in  (22).  As before,  any variable in the  conditioning set 
may  be  used  as  an  instrumental  variable  in  forming  2S2SLS  estimates 
Table 3.3 reports the results of  testing the conditional homoscedasticity 
of 3-month forward rate forecast errors.'* The tests involve the United States 
dollar's  exchange  rate  against the pound  sterling,  the  deutsche mark,  the 
Swiss franc, the Canadian dollar, and the Japanese yen. Weekly data run- 
ning  from January 7, 1976 to June 24,  1981 are employed. The data  are 
aligned to account for timing problems caused by  bank holidays and week- 
ends.  l9 
In four of  five cases, the null hypothesis of  conditional homoscedasticity 
is strongly rejected. For the Canadian dollar, there is weak evidence against 
conditional homoscedasticity  . The results suggest that  a heteroscedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix estimator should be used in conducting hypoth- 
esis tests on the coefficients of  equation (21). 
3.4.3 Empirical Results 
Results of  estimating (21) and testing UIP  appear in table  3.4.20  In all 
cases save that of the dollar-deutsche mark exchange rate, the null hypoth- 
esis of  UIP can be rejected at the 5% level. In the case of  Canada, however, 
rejection is entirely due to the large size of  2 relative to its estimated stan- 
dard error.  As the estimated slope coefficient 6 is quite close to unity, the 
rejection in the Canadian case cannot be considered very strong. 
In four of  five cases, the 3-month-forward premium has on average mis- 
predicted the direction of movement of the subsequently observed spot rate. 
of  (22). 
18. The instrumental variables were the time  f forward premia and  squared forward premia 
19.  See Riehl and Rodriguez (1977) and  Meese and Singleton (1982). 
20.  The  instrumental  variables  were  the  time  f  forward  premia  for  all  countries  in  the 
for all countries in  the sample. 
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Table 3.4  Tests of Uncovered Interest Parity (Weekly Data, January 1976 
June 1981) 
Exchange Rate  Li  6  Test Statistic 
U. S  ./U  .K.  ,0086 
(.0156) 
U.  S ./Germany  ,0214 
(.0113) 
U.S  ./Switzerland  ,048  1 
(.0214) 
U.S./Canada  -  ,0076 
(.0023) 
U.S  ./Japan  .03  I 1 
(.0097) 
-  ,2881  16.16** 
(.9741) 
-  ,7815  3.59 
(1.1579) 
-2.2145  9.11* 
(1.1 177) 
(.7922) 
(  ,6740) 
,8285  12.44** 
-2.8316  41.58** 
Nore: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  The test statistic is distributed  asymptotically as 
~'(2). * = rejection at the 5% level; ** = rejection at the  1% level. 
In the remaining case (that of  Canada), the slope coefficient, while of  the 
correct sign, is insignificantly different from zero. The test results are on the 
whole inconsistent with UIP, and they also suggest that forward premia con- 
tain  little information regarding subsequent exchange rate  fluctuations. As 
emphasized by Dornbusch (1978, 1980), Mussa (1979), and Frenkel(1981), 
exchange rate changes over the recent period of  floating seem to have been 
largely unanticipated. 
3.4.4  An Additional Test 
As a check on the validity of the conclusions reached above, an additional 
test,  suggested by  Geweke and Feige (1979) and by  Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980), was performed.  If  UIP holds, then  with weekly data and  3-month 
forward rates,  the forward forecast error  v, +  13 must be uncorrelated with 
any information dated t or earlier. In particular, if  v, +  13 is regressed on a 
constant, on  v,, and on the time t forward forecast errors for the other four 
currencies, one should not  be  able to reject the hypothesis that  all coeffi- 
cients equal  zero.  The  results  of  this  test  are reported  in table  3.5.  The 
equations were estimated by  OLS, but  the standard errors were calculated 
using a heteroscedasticity-consistent  technique. 
Rejection  at the 5% level again  occurs in  all cases except that of  Ger- 
many. Thus, the results of the present test are quite similar to those of table 
3.4. In addition, most of the estimated constant terms (Canada is the excep- 
tion) are quite insignificant. None of  the rejections in table 3.5 appears to 
be caused exclusively by  the large size of an estimated constant term relative 
to  its  standard error.  Note that  while the present tests are unable to reject 
UIP  for dollar and  deutsche mark  deposits,  tests by  Hansen  and  Hodrick 
(1980) using a different data sample do reject that hypothesis. 
While the two tests performed above cast considerable doubt on the hy- Table 3.5 
Exchange Rate  d  6,  62  63  64  65  Test Statistic 
Tests of  Uncovered Interest Parity (Weekly Data, April 1976-June  1981) 
________~ ~ 
U  .S./U.K.  ,0088 
(.0112) 
U.S  ./Germany  -  ,0049 
(.0098) 
U.S./Switzerland  -  ,0071 
(.0137) 
U  .S  ./Canada  -  ,0093 
(.0030) 
U .  S .  /Japan  .0042 
(.0115) 
,1147 
-  ,0176 
(.  2102) 
(.1509) 
-  .I493 
(.2  137) 
~  ,0464 
(.0462) 
-  .I462 









-  ,0304 
-  .023  I 
-  .1979 







-  ,0121 
(.2530) 
,3059 




(  ,6477) 
(  ,1479) 
,5836 
(.43  16) 
-  ,2190 
,0054  22.9 1  ** 
,0187  7.61 
,2333  13.00* 
-  .I060  50.97*  * 
,4679  21.69** 
(. 1809) 
(.1785) 
(.  262 1) 
(.0430) 
(. 1439) 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. The coefficient a represents a constant. The b, (i =  1, . . . , 5)  are the coefficients of  the lagged forecast errors 
for the five currencies. b, = U.K., b2 = Germany, b3 = Switzerland, b4 = Canada, and b5 = Japan. The test statistic is distributed asymptotically as ~~(6). 
* = rejection at the 5% level; ** = rejection at the  1%  level. 141 
pothesis of  perfect asset substitutability, their results  should be  interpreted 
with caution. First, political uncertainties or fears of bank failures may have 
introduced an  element of  default risk  into forward transactions during the 
sample period.  A  second  issue is  the  “peso  problem”  (Rogoff  1979 and 
Krasker 1980), which is essentially a problem of  finite sample inference. If 
agents, over some significant time period, expect a major central bank inter- 
vention which does not materialize, nonoverlapping forward forecast errors 
will  be  correlated in the sample even  if  the expectation of  intervention is 
rational in the light of  past central bank  behavior. While agents would  be 
correct on average given an  infinite sample containing infinitely many such 
episodes, econometricians have only a finite history at their disposal. The 
dramatic central bank interventions in the fourth quarters of  1978 and  1979 
are examples of  the type of  event which, if incorrectly anticipated ex  post, 
may give rise to a spurious correlation in nonoverlapping forecast errors. 
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3.5  Exchange Rates and National Price Levels 
The absolute version of  the purchasing power parity  (PPP) doctrine has 
not  fared well  in econometric tests on recent data,  at  least not  in tests in- 
volving the United States (see, e.g., Krugman 1978; Frenkel 1981). Figures 
3.6-3.10  display the time series of monthly first differences of the logarithm 
of  the real exchange rates of  the United  Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, 
Canada, and Japan against the United States. The real exchange rate is de- 
fined as the dollar “value”  of  the foreign WPI divided by  the United States 
WPI.  The figures reveal that for all countries, the  floating rate period has 
been  a period  of  much  higher real  exchange rate  variability  vis-a-vis the 
United States than was the Bretton Woods era.23  The increase in the ampli- 
tude of  deviations from PPP begins abruptly with  the adoption of  flexible 
rates.  22 
Here,  we  test  whether  relative PPP holds  ex  ante,  that  is,  whether ex- 
pected exchange rate depreciation reflects the expected inflation differential 
between the home and foreign countries. If  ex ante PPP does not hold, ex 
ante real interest rates will generally differ internationally. As Magee (1978) 
and Roll (1979) observe, under certain assumptions ex ante PPP is a con- 
sequence of  the efficiency of  international commodity markets. Both  Roll 
(1979) and Frenkel (1981) present evidence that  changes in real exchange 
rates are serially uncorrelated, and thus possess a key property of  forecast 
error series. 
21.  There are two sharp jumps in  the German series over the Bretton Woods period. These 
correspond to the deutsche mark revaluations of  1961 and 1969. The spike in the United King- 
dom series corresponds to the sterling devaluation of  1967. 
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Fig. 3.10  Change in the real exchange rate between the United States and 
Japan (monthly data). 
3.5.1  A Test of the Hypothesis 
combining (2) with (6a) and (6b) we obtain the equation 
To design a test of  ex  ante relative PPP we  return  to equation (2). By 
(23)  Tr+k -  T?+k  = &[In  (Sr+k/Sr)l  +  Ur+k -  U?+k. 
If  &[In (s[+k/Sr)]  were observable, a test of  whether a  = 0  and b  =  1 in 
the equation 
(24)  T[+k -  T?+k  = a  + b  (Sr+k/Sr)l + er+k 
would be a test of ex ante relative PPP. Because the regressor in (24) is not 
observable,  however,  we  must find a proxy variable. One possibility,  fol- 
lowing McCallum (1976), is to use the realized depreciation In (S,+k/Sr)  as 
a proxy. With this substitution, (24) becomes 
(25)  T[+k -  T?+k  = a  -4-  b  In (Sr+k/Sr) f er+k - bv,+k, 
where vr+k = In (St+dS,) -  &[In (Sr+dSt)].  Because the independent var- 
iable in (25) is correlated with the composite disturbance  -  bvt+k,  OLS 
is an inconsistent estimation procedure here.  But an  instrumental variables 
estimator such as 2S2SLS can be used to estimate [a  b]’  consistently. Since 
er+k  and  Vr+k are rational forecast errors, any relevant variables in the time 
r information set may be used as instrumental variables. 145  International Interest Rate and Price Level Linkages 
Table 3.6  Tests of Ex Ante PPP (September 1975-May  1981) 
Price  Test 
Countries  Index  h  6  Statistic 
U.S./U.K.  CPI  -  ,0033  .I660  48.32** 
U.S./U.K.  WPI  -  ,0048  -  .1763  17.07** 
U.S./Germany  CPI  .0033  ,1902  166.21** 
U.  S  ./Germany  WPI  ,0034  -  ,1707  94.25* * 
U.S./Switzerland  CPI  .w37  ,1174  63.98** 
U. S  ./Switzerland  WPI  .0073  ~  ,2333  29.94* * 
U.S  ./Canada  CPI  -  ,0003  .0822  65.13** 
U.S./Canada  WPI  -  ,0002  ,1984  26.87** 
U.S./Japan  CPI  ,0007  .I523  21.46** 
U.  S  ./Japan  WPI  ,0037  ,0330  180.79** 
(.0010)  (.  1205) 
(.0012)  (.3415) 
(.0006)  (.0789) 
(.W)  (.1218) 
(.0007)  (.111 I) 
(.0018)  (.2255) 
(.oow  (.1395) 
(.0007)  (. 1786) 
(.0012)  (. 1848) 
(.OOOS)  (.0725) 
Note: Standard errors appear in  parentheses.  The test statistic is distributed asymptotically as 
~~(2).  * = rejection at the 5% level; ** = rejection at the  1%  level. 
3.5.2 Empirical Results 
Results  of  estimating  (25)  over  a  I-month  forecasting  horizon  with 
monthly data are reported in table 3.6.23  As in  the previous tests, a heter- 
oscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator was employed. Tests of 
the null hypothesis for a 3-month forecasting horizon were also performed, 
but these are not reported as they only reinforce the message of table 3.6. 
That message is that expected exchange rate changes have been poor and 
biased  predictors of  relative  inflation  rates  over  the  years  of  generalized 
floating. The  hypothesis a  = 0 and  b  =  1  is  decisively rejected  for all 
countries,  regardless of  the price index  used. Further, the estimated slope 
coefficients are almost always insignificant and frequently of the wrong sign. 
The one exception to this  occurs in  the case of  the dollar-deutsche  mark 
rate,  where we  find that  the  expected depreciation rate  does help forecast 
the United StatesGerman CPI inflation differential. 
Table 3.7 uses  the adjusted @statistic  of  Ljung  and  Box  (1978) to test 
whether real exchange rate changes have been serially uncorrelated in recent 
23.  Instruments were lagged inflation differentials vis-a-vis the United States for all countries 
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Table 3.7  Tests for Serial Correlation of Real Exchange Rate Changes 
(September 1975May 1981) 
Countries 
Price  Marginal 
Index  Test Statistic  Significance Level 




U.  S ./S  witzerland 
U.S./Switzerland 
U.S./Canada 
U.  S  ./Canada 
U.  S ./Japan 































Noret The test statistic is distributed asymptotically as ~’(12) 
years.  The test  statistics, which  are computed for  12 lags  using  monthly 
data, confirm the Roll-Frenkel  finding that  real  exchange rate  changes are 
not serially correlated. Only in the Canadian case can the null hypothesis of 
no serial  correlation  be rejected  at  better  than  the  20%  significance  level. 
While the foregoing evidence supports ex ante relative  PPP, the results of 
table 3.6 are strongly at variance with that hypothesis.  On balance, it seems 
reasonable  to conclude that the “efficient  markets”  version  of  relative PPP 
has not characterized  the recent experience with floating rates. 
3.6  Conclusion 
This paper has studied the interplay among price levels, interest rates, and 
exchange rates over the recent period of managed exchange rate flexibility. 
Attention  was focused on the two classical parity conditions that link prices 
and  nominal  interest  rates internationally  and  on  their corollary, the inter- 
national equality of  ex ante real rates of interest. Econometric tests of  these 
propositions within  a rational  expectations  framework provided  significant 
evidence against them. As a by-product  of the investigation,  we found that 
inflation and exchange rate forecast errors appear to be conditionally  heter- 
oscedastic. 
When monetary  disturbances are dominant, the classical  parity  relation- 
ships may be a reliable  guide to the comovements of nominal  macro vari- 
ables. But the past decade has been characterized by moderate inflation cou- 
pled  with substantial  real disturbances. In such circumstances, the classical 
conditions appear to  be too simple and aggregative  to provide an adequate 
explanation of macroeconomic events in a world of  differentiated  commod- 
ities and assets. 147  International Interest Rate and Price Level Linkages 
Whether the failure of the parity relations has conferred monetary auton- 
omy on small open economies is an entirely distinct question. Further theo- 
retical and empirical research is  needed before a confident answer can be 
ventured. 
Appendix: The Data 
Section 3.3 
Prices: WPIs are taken  from International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS), line 
63. CPIs come from IFS, line 64. 
Interest Rates: The  1- and 3-month Eurocurrency deposit rates come from 
Data Resources, Inc. (for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland) 
and from the  Harris Bank of  Chicago Weekly Review  (for Canada and Ja- 
pan). The 3-month domestic money market rates come from Morgan Guar- 
anty's  World Financial Markets, and  are quoted at or  near the end of  the 
month.  For the United  States,  the  rate  on  prime industrial  paper is  used. 
Interbank deposit rates  are used  for the  United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and 
Switzerland. For Canada,  the  rate  used  is that on  prime finance company 
paper.  The interest rate on  3-month repurchase agreements is used  as the 
Japanese money market rate. 
Section 3.4 
Spot and  3-month-forward exchange rates are noon rates collected by  the 
Federal Reserve System. Spot rates are matched to the maturity of the cor- 
responding forward contract,  as described by  Riehl and Rodriguez (1977). 
Morgan Guaranty's  World Calendar of  Holidays is used to account for bank 
holidays, weekends, etc . 
Section 3.5 
Prices: Same as Section 3.3. 
Exchange Rates: End-of-month rates taken from IFS, line ag. 
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